Dogwhistles,	Political	Manipulation	and	Philosophy	of Language	(Draft,	1	February	2016:	Do	not	cite without	permission) Jennifer	Saul You	start	out	in	1954	by	saying,	"Nigger,	nigger,	nigger."	By	1968,	you can't	say	"nigger"	-	that	hurts	you.	Backfires.	So	you	say	stuff	like	forced busing,	states'	rights	and	all	that	stuff.	You're	getting	so	abstract	now [that]	you're	talking	about	cutting	taxes,	and	all	these	things	you're talking	about	are	totally	economic	things	and	a	byproduct	of	them	is [that]	blacks	get	hurt	worse	than	whites.	And	subconsciously	maybe	that is	part	of	it.	I'm	not	saying	that.	But	I'm	saying	that	if	it	is	getting	that abstract,	and	that	coded,	that	we	are	doing	away	with	the	racial	problem one	way	or	the	other.	You	follow	me	-	because	obviously	sitting	around saying,	"We	want	to	cut	this,"	is	much	more	abstract	than	even	the	busing thing,	and	a	hell	of	a	lot	more	abstract	than	"Nigger,	nigger." Lee	Atwater,	quoted	in	Lamis	1990 In	recent	years,	two	very	welcome	changes	have	come	to	philosophy	of	language. The	philosophy	of	language	that	I	was	"raised"	in	was	that	of	the	eighties	and nineties	in	the	US. Our	focus	was	almost	exclusively	on	semantic	content, reference	and	truth	conditions. I	say	"almost	exclusively"	because	Grice's	notion of	conversational	implicature	was	a	notable	exception	to	this-this	notion	was the	topic	of	great	interest,	because	it	allowed	semantic	theorists	to	explain	away intuitions	that	seemed	to	conflict	with	their	preferred	theory	as	"merely pragmatic". Recently,	philosophy	of	language	has	broadened	in	two	significant	ways. The most	important	shift,	to	my	mind,	is	a	move	to	consider	the	ethical	and	political dimensions	of	language. These	were	never	forgotten	by	philosophers	more broadly,	but	until	recently	they	were	left	almost	exclusively	to	ethicists	and political	philosophers. Now,	however,	philosophers	of	language	are	working	to understand	hate	speech,	political	manipulation,	propaganda	and	lies. These issues-vital	in	the	real	world-have	not	yet	become	central	to	philosophy	of language. But	they	are	at	least	a	part	of	the	conversation,	in	a	way	that	they weren't	twenty	years	ago. With	this	shift	(though	not	wholly	as	a	result	of	it),	has come	an	increasing	interest	in	matters	other	than	semantic	content	and reference. Implicature,	accommodation	and	speech	acts	are	the	central	notions in	these	new	debates,	rather	than	semantic	content.1 And	yet,	I	will	be	arguing,	these	new	discussions	have	not	yet	moved	far	enough away	from	the	focus	on	content. Fully	making	sense	of	politically	manipulative speech	will	require	a	detailed	engagement	with	certain	forms	of	speech	that function	at	an	implicit	level-with	something	other	than	semantically	expressed or	pragmatically	conveyed	content;	and	with	effects	of	utterances	that	are	their very	point	and	that	nonetheless	vanish	as	soon	as	they	are	made	explicit. None of	the	machinery	developed	in	detail	so	far	is	equipped	for	this	task. This	task,	however,	is	an	absolutely	vital	one. Dogwhistles,	we	will	see,	are	a disturbingly	important	tool	of	covert	political	manipulation. They	are	in	fact	one of	the	most	powerful	forms	of	political	speech,	allowing	for	people	to	be manipulated	in	ways	that	they	would	resist	if	the	manipulation	was	carried	out more	openly-	often	drawing	on	racist	attitudes	that	are	consciously	rejected. If philosophers	focus	only	on	more	overt	speech,	which	does	its	work	via	content expressed	or	otherwise	consciously	conveyed,	they	will	miss	much	of	what	is 1	This	isn't	meant	to	suggest	that	speech	act	theory	is	new,	just	that	it	had	fallen out	of	fashion	at	least	in	the	circles	I	moved	in. most	powerful	and	pernicious	in	the	speech	of	our	political	culture. This	paper	is a	call	to	start	paying	attention	to	these	more	covert	speech	acts,	and	a	first attempt	at	beginning	to	theorise	them. 1. Dogwhistles My	focus	in	this	paper	is	on	dogwhistles. 'Dogwhistle'	is	a	relatively	new	term	in politics,	arising	out	of	US	political	journalism	in	the	1980s.	The	first	recorded	use of	the	term	seems	to	have	been	by	Richard	Morin	of	the	Washington	Post, discussing	a	curious	phenomenon	that	had	been	noticed	in	opinion	polling. Subtle	changes	in	question-wording	sometimes	produce	remarkably	different results...	researchers	call	this	the	'Dog	Whistle	Effect':	Respondents	hear something	in	the	question	that	researchers	do	not. (1988) The	idea	of	a	political	dogwhistle	shifted	somewhat	over	the	next	decades	to focus	mainly	on	a	kind	of	deliberate	manipulation,	usually	by	politicians	(or	their handlers),	designed	to	be	unnoticed	by	most	of	the	public. (We	will	refine	this definition	over	the	course	of	this	paper.)	We	will	see,	though,	that	this	sort	of manipulation	comes	in	importantly	different	varieties,	which	we	will	tease	apart and	examine	over	the	course	of	this	paper. Dogwhistles	may	be	explicit	or implicit,	and	within	each	of	these	categories	they	may	be	intentional	or unintentional. 2.	Intentional	Dogwhistles 2.1 Explicit	Intentional	Dogwhistles Kimberly	Witten	(forthcoming)	is	one	of	very	few	linguists	who	has	worked	on dogwhistles. Her	focus	is	exclusively	on	the	sort	of	dogwhistle	that	I	call	an explicit	intentional	dogwhistle,	and	her	definition	(of	'dogwhistle')	is	an	excellent one	for	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle. A[n explicit intentional] dogwhistle is a speech act designed, with intent, to allow two plausible interpretations, with one interpretation being a private, coded message targeted for a subset of the general audience, and concealed in such a way that this general audience is unaware of the existence of the second, coded interpretation. (Witten: 2) Although the main interest of dogwhistles lies in their political use, Witten rightly argues that the concept applies more broadly. As a parent, I was shocked to revisit some of my favourite childhood entertainments and see much that I had missed as a child. Watching Bugs Bunny with my small son, I was surprised to see references to old movies that children couldn't be expected to know, and even more surprised to see that one of these was Last Tango in Paris. Finding these references of course made the endless re-viewings less tedious. And, of course, this was the intent of their makers. Witten suggests that this should be considered a dogwhistle-a concealed message for a subset of the cartoons' general audience.2 The	most	important	sort	of	intentional	explicit	dogwhistle,	however,	is	that	used by	politicians. Dogwhistle	utterances	allow	a	candidate	to	send	a	message	to	one portion	of	the	electorate	that	other	portions	might	find	alienating. These	will	be my	main	focus	here.	We'll	start	with	some	examples. 2.1.1 "Wonder-working	power" George	W.	Bush	faced	a	tricky	situation	with	respect	to	his	faith	throughout	his candidacies. He	desperately	needed	the	votes	of	fundamentalist	Christians,	and yet	it	was	also	clear	that	many	others-whose	votes	he	also	needed	for	the general	elections-were	made	nervous	by	fundamentalist	Christianity. The solution	his	speech-writers	used	was	to	dogwhistle	to	the	fundamentalists. A nice	example	of	this	is	Bush's	utterance	in	his	2003	State	of	the	Union	speech: Yet there's power, wonder-working power, in the goodness and idealism and faith of the American people. (Noah 2004) 2	Witten	discusses	different	examples,	but	the	idea	of	dogwhistles	for	parents	in children's	entertainment	is	hers. To a non-fundamentalist this is an ordinary piece of fluffy political boilerplate, which passes without notice. But a fundamentalist Christian will hear the dogwhistle. Amongst fundamentalists, "wonderworking power" is a favoured phrase that refers specifically to the power of Christ. There are two messages a fundamentalist might take from this. The first is a kind of translation into their idiolect, to yield an explicitly Christian message that would alienate many: Yet there's power, the power of Christ, in the goodness and idealism and faith of the American people.3 The second is simply the fact that Bush does speak their idiolect-indicating that he is one of them. The first message is very clearly an explicit intentional dogwhistle: it is a coded, concealed message, intended for just a subgroup of the general audience. In fact, it functions rather like the exploitation of a little-known ambiguity. The second is a little messier. It is somewhat like speaking in a regional accent that gives a feeling of kinship to a particular audience. But it's crucially different because, unlike an accent, it can't be heard by everyone. Arguably, then (assuming that it is done intentionally), this is still an explicit intentional dogwhistle-it is a coded message for a subgroup, concealed by an apparently straightforward message. 2.1.2 "Dred	Scott" George	W.	Bush	also,	like	many	conservatives,	makes	a	point	of	declaring	his opposition	to	the	Dred	Scott	decision,	which	1957	affirmed	that	slaves	remain their	owners'	property	even	when	taken	to	free	territories. This	is	somewhat baffling	to	those	it's	not	directed	to,	who	take	it	for	granted	that	even	a	rightwing	Republican	opposes	slavery,	and	who	think	this	opposition	should	go without	saying. But	most	viewers	were	not	who	Bush	was	addressing	with	this dogwhistle. Bush	was	addressing	the	anti-abortion	right,	and	he	was dogwhistling	about	his	opposition	to	abortion. 3	Presenting	this	paper	to	audiences	in	the	US,	I've	found	that	this	interpretation is	controversial. Some	Christians	think	it's	exactly	right,	while	others	think	it would	be	wrong	to	read	it	this	way,	and	that	doing	so	would	yield	a	heretical utterance. For	the	latter	group,	obviously	the	second	interpretation	in	the	text will	make	more	sense. This	dogwhistle	functions	somewhat	differently:	it	works	because	it	is	very common	for	right-wing	commentators	to	discuss	the	Dred	Scott	decision	when discussing	abortion	rights,	but	in	a	variety	of	ways. Sometimes	it	is	an	example of	a	bad	Supreme	Court	decision	in	need	of	overturning	(like	Roe	V	Wade). Sometimes	it	is	a	part	of	an	analogy	between	the	unrecognized	personhood	of slaves	and	(purported)	unrecognized	personhood	of	fetuses. But	it	is	so	common to	discuss	it	when	discussing	abortion-and,	crucially,	so	baffling	to	discuss	it otherwise-that	it	can	serve	to	signal	Bush's	opposition	to	abortion,	and	his desire	to	see	Roe	overturned. The	exact	details	of	how	this	one	works	are	a	little	bit	murky. It	may	work	like the	old	movie	references	in	children's	cartoons:	designed	to	trigger	allusions	for those	in	the	know. Those	who	know	the	prominent	role	of	Dred	Scott	in	antiabortion	discussions	will	know	that	Bush	is	deliberately	reminding	them	of these,	and	take	from	this	the	message	that	he	too	is	anti-abortion,	and	thinks	Roe should	be	overturned. Alternatively,	it	may	even	be	that	"I	oppose	Dred	Scott" and	similar	utterances	have	come	to	serve	as	generalized	conversational implicatures	indicating	opposition	to	abortion. One	can	certainly	tell	a	story	of how	they'd	be	calculated: He's	stating	his	opposition	to	Dred	Scott.	But	everyone opposes	Dred	Scott,	and	that's	not	relevant	to	the	question	he	was	being	asked. He must	be	trying	to	convey	something	else-that	he	is	opposed	to	abortion,	like	those other	people	who	talk	about	Dred	Scott. Either	way,	this	is	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle:	it	is	a	conveying	of	a	coded, concealed	message	to	a	subset	of	the	general	audience. 2.2 Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	are	far	more	complicated	to	make	sense	of. They	play	a	special	role	in	American	race	discourse,	due	to	presence	of	what	Tali Mendelberg	calls	the	Norm	of	Racial	Equality. (Mendelberg	does	not	use	the term	'dogwhistle'	for	these,	though	later	writers	such	as	Ian	Haney	Lopez	2014 do.	She	simply	refers	to	'implicit	political	communication'.) Prior	to	the	1930s, Mendelberg	argues	that	it	was	acceptable	to	explicitly	express	racist	attitudes	in American	political	discourse. More	specifically,	she	notes	that	it	was	acceptable to	use	obviously	pejorative	terminology;	to	assert	that	black	people	are	innately inferior	to	white	people;	and	to	express	support	for	legal	discrimination,	such	as legally	enforced	segregation	or	refusal	to	hire	black	people.	Not	everyone	did	so, of	course-but	doing	so	did	not	render	one	beyond	the	bounds	of	acceptable political	engagement. Those	courting	racist	voters	could	do	so	by	simply proclaiming	their	racist	views.	From	the	1930s	to	the	1960s,	according	to Mendelberg,	the	prevailing	norm	of	racial	inequality	"began	to	erode" (Mendelberg	67).	After	the	1960s,	however,	this	became	increasingly unacceptable. Most	voters	now	no	longer	wanted	to	think	of	themselves	as racist. However,	it	remained	the	case	that	large	numbers	of	white	voters	displayed	high levels	of	what	psychologists	call	"racial	resentment"	toward	black	people. White voters	are	highly	unlikely	to	endorse	claims	of	innate	black	inferiority. However, a	belief	system	that	psychologists	have	called	'racial	resentment'4	remains widespread. Racial	resentment	includes	four	main	claims:	"blacks	no	longer	face much	discrimination,	(2)	their	disadvantage	mainly	reflects	their	poor	work ethic,	(3)	they	are	demanding	too	much	too	fast,	(4)	they	have	gotten	more	than they	deserve."	(Tesler	and	Sears	2010:	18,	citing	Henry	and	Sears	2002,	2005.) Psychologists	standardly	test	for	racial	resentment	by	asking	for	degree	of agreement	or	disagreement	with	the	following	statements	(Tesler	and	Sears 2010:	19): • Irish,	Italian,	Jewish	and	many	other	minorities	overcame prejudice	and	worked	their	way	up.	Blacks	should	do	the	same without	any	special	favours. 4	Tesler	and	Sears,	who	I	quote	below,	use	the	term	'symbolic	racism',	but	they note	that	they	use	it	interchangeably	with	Mendelberg's	preferred	term,	'racial resentment'. • Generations	of	slavery	and	discrimination	have	created	conditions that	make	it	difficult	for	blacks	to	work	their	way	out	of	the	lower class. • Over	the	past	few	years,	blacks	have	gotten	less	than	they	deserve. • It's	really	a	matter	of	some	people	not	trying	hard	enough;	if	blacks would	only	try	harder	they	could	be	just	as	well	off	as	whites. The	various	possible	responses	are	assigned	scores	on	a	score	ranging	from most	racially	liberal	to	most	racially	conservative.	White	Americans	are,	overall, on	the	racially	conservative	end	of	the	spectrum,	and	Republicans	significantly more	so	than	Democrats. Mendelberg	describes	this	situation	as	one	in	which	a	"norm	of	racial	equality"	is in	place,	despite	the	persistence	of	racial	resentment.	Her	phrasing	may	be somewhat	misleading,	however. It	seems	to	me	certainly	not	the	case	that	the majority	of	white	Americans	assent	to	any	very	strong	notion	of	racial	equality,	if they	give	the	answers	that	count	as	racially	resentful	on	the	above	items. Moreover,	it	is	clearly	still	quite	socially	acceptable	to	make	reference	to	the	ills of	black	culture,	blaming	black	poverty	and	even	police	killings	of	unarmed	black people	on	this	cause.	What	Mendelberg	calls	the	'norm	of	racial	equality"	clearly doesn't	preclude	these	sorts	of	utterances. Indeed,	she	herself	notes	a	tendency to	conform	to	the	norm	"in	the	most	minimal,	symbolic	way	possible" (Mendelberg	2001:	92). One	plausible	way	of	understanding	this	is	that	white Americans	feel	the	need	to	pay	lip	service	to	something	that	could	be	called "racial	equality". Exactly	what	this	comes	to	may	vary	somewhat,	but	it	seems	to preclude	the	use	of	obvious	pejoratives,	assertions	of	genetic	(though	not cultural)	inferiority,	and	support	for	obviously	discriminatory	behavior	(legally enforced	segregation,	rules	against	hiring	black	people,	etc). The	only	kind	of racial	equality	this	commits	one	to	is	an	extremely	thin	sort	of	formal	equality. But	Mendelberg	is	clearly	right	that	the	bounds	of	permissible	racial	discourse have	shifted	somewhat,	even	if	they	do	not	yet	require	support	for	any substantive	sort	of	equality.5 Despite	these	reservations	about	terminology	we will	follow	Mendelberg	and	refer	to	the	current	situation	as	one	in	which	the Norm	of	Racial	Equality	is	in	force. Politicians	who	might	in	a	different	era	have	explicitly	expressed	obviously	racist views	in	order	to	reach	proudly	racist	voters	now	need	to	find	a	subtler	way	to signal	a	kind	of	psychological	kinship	with	these	"racially	resentful"	voters.6 An explicit	racist	dogwhistle	wouldn't	work-while	it	would	improve	on	an unambiguously	racist	utterance,	it	would	still	be	recognized	as	racist	by	its intended	audience. And	most	of	this	audience	would	reject	something	that	was explicitly	and	unambiguously	racist-doing	otherwise	would	call	into	question their	now-cherished	commitment	to	egalitarianism. (Importantly,	of	course,	not everyone	would	reject	explicit	racism. But	our	focus	here	is	on	the	large	segment of	the	population	that	would.) An	implicit	dogwhistle,	however,	could	do	the	job. Such	an	utterance	would appear	on	its	face	to	be	innocuous	and	unrelated	to	race-lending	deniability	if confronted	with	racism	accusations. And,	if	the	dogwhistled	content	could	do	its work	outside	the	dogwhistle-audience's	awareness,	it	would	not	be	rejected	in the	way	that	an	explicitly	racist	dogwhistle	would	be. But	how	could	a	dogwhistle	work	in	this	way? How	can	a	racist	message	be communicated	effectively	enough	to	influence	an	audience's	voting	decisions, without	the	audience	being	aware	of	it? Working	through	examples	will	help	us to	see	this. 5	It	is	also	worth	noting,	and	exploring	at	a	different	time,	that	many	white Americans	have	come	to	think	of	themselves	as	victims	of	racial	discrimination, and	to	openly	assert	this	(Lopez,	citing	Greenberg:	71).	This	may	be	another	way that	racial	resentment	can	be	expressed	without	violating	the	Norm	of	Racial Equality:	those	who	express	this	view	would	claim	that	they	support	equality,	but that	they	(not	black	Americans)	are	the	ones	being	treated	less	well. 6	Which	utterances	are	obviously	racist	is	obviously	a	matter	on	which disagreement	arises. It	seems	to	me	that	assertions	of	black	cultural	inferiority are	obviously	racist,	but	it	is	clear	that	for	many	white	people	these	are	not obviously	racist. But	as	noted,	these	have	survived	the	presence	of	the	"norm	of racial	equality". 2.2.1 Willie	Horton The	most	famous	example	of	an	implicit	intentional	dogwhistle	is	the	immensely successful	Willie	Horton	ad,	used	in	George	H.	W.	Bush's	campaign	against Michael	Dukakis. (I	take	my	discussion	of	this	from	Mendelberg,	Chapters	5-8.) This	ad	criticized	the	prison	furlough	programme	that	was	in	place	during Dukakis's	time	as	governor	by	telling	the	tale	of	a	furloughed	convict,	Willie Horton. Horton	assaulted	a	couple	in	their	home,	raping	the	woman	and stabbing	the	man. Race	is	not	mentioned	at	any	point	in	the	ad. However,	the illustration	for	the	ad	is	a	photo	of	Willie	Horton,	and	Horton	is	black. The	Bush campaign	made	Horton	a	key	issue,	and	this	led	to	the	ad	receiving	enormous airplay	on	the	news. Prior	to	the	Willie	Horton	ad,	Dukakis	was	substantially	ahead	in	the	opinion polls. As	the	ad	aired	and	was	discussed,	he	immediately	began	to	plummet. During	most	of	this	time,	the	ad	was	not	discussed	in	connection	with	race. It was	discussed	as	a	part	of	stories	on	the	role	of	crime	in	the	campaign,	or negative	campaigning. However,	quite	late,	Jesse	Jackson	called	the	Willie Horton	ad	"racist". This	charge	was	at	the	time	viewed	with	great	skepticism (though	it's	extremely	widely	accepted	now),	and	viewed	as	an	illicit	attempt	by Democrats	to	"play	the	race	card". But	it	was	widely	discussed. As	soon	as	the possibility	of	racism	was	raised,	the	ad	ceased	to	function	wholly	on	an	implicit level. Viewers	began	to	consider	the	possibility	that	something	racial	might	be going	on. And	at	this	point,	Dukakis	started	to	rise	in	the	polls	again-some indication	that	the	ad	had	ceased	to	be	effective	once	race	was	explicitly	under discussion. But	of	course,	none	of	this	really	shows	that	the	ad	was	responsible	for	these effects,	or	that	race	had	anything	to	do	with	it	(though	the	effect	of	the	Jackson intervention	is	suggestive.) Far	more	informative	is	the	data	gathered	during	the campaign	about	the	effects	on	voters. These	data	show	that	while	levels	of	racial resentment	were	unaffected	by	viewing	the	ad,	the	relationship	between	racial resentment	and	voting	intentions	was	strongly	influenced	by	the	ad. Specifically, increasing	exposure	to	the	ad	increased	the	likelihood	of	racially	resentful	voters favouring	Bush.	And,	crucially,	as	soon	as	Jackson	criticized	the	ad	as	racist,	this correlation	began	to	decline. Mendelberg	argues	that	the	dogwhistle	acts	upon	pre-existing	racial	attitudes, unconsciously	bringing	them	to	bear	where	they	might	previously	not	have	been drawn	upon-in	this	case	on	voting	preferences. But	she	also	notes	something else	that	is	vital:	once	race	starts	to	be	consciously	reflected	on,	the	dogwhistle ceases	to	be	fully	implicit. This	drastically	diminishes	its	effectiveness, presumably	due	to	the	widespread	conscious	acceptance	of	the	norm	of	racial equality.	As	Mendelberg	writes,	"As	soon	as	a	person	is	alerted	to	the	need	to	pay conscious	attention	to	her	response,	accessibility	is	no	longer	sufficient	to	make her	rely	upon	racial	predispositions"	(Mendelberg	2001:	210).	Mendelberg's experimental	data	back	this	up,	showing	a	sizable	relationship	between	racial resentment	and	policy	preferences	after	viewing	an	implicitly	racial	ad,	but	no relationship	after	viewing	an	explicitly	racial	ad	(Chapter	7). 2.2.2 'Inner	City' In	the	United	States,	'inner	city'	has	come	to	function	as	a	dogwhistle	for	black. Thus,	politicians	who	would	be	rebuked	if	they	called	for	harsher	measures against	black	criminals	can	safely	call	for	cracking	down	on	inner	city	crime. Psychologists	have	studied	the	effects	of	the	phrase	"inner	city",	and	it	seems	to function	very	similarly	to	the	Willie	Horton	ad.	Horwitz	and	Peffley	(2005) randomly	assigned	subjects	to	two	groups,	with	one	group	being	asked	question A	below,	and	one	group	being	asked	question	B	(difference	underlined	by	me, from	102-3). A. Some	people	want	to	increase	spending	for	new	prisons	to	lock	up	violent criminals.	Other	people	would	rather	spend	this	money	for	antipoverty programs	to	prevent	crime.	What	about	you?	If	you	had	to	choose,	would you	rather	see	this	money	spent	on	building	new	prisons,	or	on antipoverty	programs? B. Some	people	want	to	increase	spending	for	new	prisons	to	lock	up	violent inner	city	criminals.	Other	people	would	rather	spend	this	money	for antipoverty	programs	to	prevent	crime.	What	about	you?	If	you	had	to choose,	would	you	rather	see	this	money	spent	on	building	new	prisons, or	on	antipoverty	programs? This	small	change-the	addition	of	'inner	city'-turned	out	to	have	a	significant effect	on	the	answer	that	subjects	gave,	but	the	nature	of	this	effect	was	strongly influenced	by	subjects'	pre-existing	racial	attitudes. Prior	to	being	asked	A	or	B above,	subjects	were	questioned	about	their	acceptance	of	racial	stereotypes	and their	beliefs	regarding	the	racial	fairness	of	the	justice	system. "Racial conservatives"	tended	to	hold	negative	stereotypes	of	black	people	and	to believe	the	system	to	be	racially	fair. "Racial	liberals"	were	the	opposite. When	'inner	city'	was	added	to	the	question	(as	in	B)	subjects'	attitudes	toward spending	were	strongly	influenced	by	their	pre-existing	racial	attitudes-with racial	conservatives	more	likely	to	favour	prison	spending	and	racial	liberals more	likely	to	oppose	it. But	when	'inner	city'	was	not	present	(as	in	A)	there was	no	relationship	between	racial	attitudes	and	answers	to	the	question. This shows	that	'inner	city'	serves	to	raise	subjects'	pre-existing	racial	attitudes	to salience	and	bring	them	to	bear	on	a	question,	where	they	would	not	otherwise be	brought	to	bear-just	as	the	Willie	Horton	ad	does.7 3. Unintentional	Dogwhistles 7	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	effect	on	racial	liberals	was	due	to	implicit	or	explicit processes. It	is	possible	that	racial	liberals	reflected	explicitly	on	the	use	of 'inner	city'	as	a	euphemism	for	'black',	rather	than	simply	having	their	racial attitudes	raised	to	non-conscious	salience. In	general,	racial	liberals	have	not been	the	focus	of	studies	on	racial	priming	and	dogwhistles. Many	thanks	to Rosie	Worsdale	for	raising	this	point. Thus	far,	our	focus	has	been	on	intentional	dogwhistles.	However,	a	crucial	fact about	the	way	that	dogwhistles	function	and	do	their	work	in	the	world	is	the way	in	which	they	can	be	unintentionally	passed	on,	with	identical	effects	to	the original	dogwhistle. This	is	wholly	predictable,	from	the	fact	that	audiences	will very	often	be	unaware	of	a	dogwhistle's	presence-they	may,	and	do,	repeat	the dogwhistle	unwittingly. I	will	call	these	utterances	unintentional	dogwhistles, and	in	this	section	of	the	paper	we	will	work	through	a	few	examples.	My working	definition	of	'unintentional	dogwhistle'	will	be	as	follows: Unwitting	use	of	words	and/or	images	that,	used	intentionally,	constitute an	intentional	dogwhistle,	where	this	use	has	the	same	effect	as	an intentional	dogwhistle. To	see	that	this	is	possible,	just	reflect	briefly	on	the	Dred	Scott	dogwhistle	that we've	already	discussed. Now	imagine	a	debate,	in	which	the	left-wing	candidate is	puzzled	by	the	right-wing	candidate	expressing	their	opposition	to	Dred	Scott: they	had	not	taken	slavery	to	be	a	live	issue,	and	they	are	unaware	of	the dogwhistle. Confused,	they	become	worried	that	they	might	be	taken	to	support slavery	if	they	do	not	also	start	expressing	their	opposition	to	Dred	Scott-so they,	too,	start	waxing	eloquent	on	the	wrongness	of	this	decision. But	since discussing	Dred	Scott	dogwhistles	opposition	to	abortion	they	unintentionally (and	falsely)	dogwhistle	their	opposition	to	abortion. Very	importantly,	though,	we	don't	need	to	rely	on	fanciful	cases	like	this. Secondary	dogwhistles	are	real,	and	they	are	in	fact	often	a	part	of	the	primary dogwhistlers'	plan. 3.1	Barry	Goldwater Barry	Goldwater,	the	1964	Republican	nominee	for	President,	gives	us	a fascinating	case	of	a	secondary	dogwhistle. (Here	I	again	draw	heavily	on Mendelberg,	84-88.)	Goldwater	was,	for	his	time	and	definitely	for	his	party, relatively	on	the	left	when	it	came	to	issues	of	race. He	was	a	founding	member of	the	Arizona	NAACP,	an	important	civil	rights	organization.8 However,	he	was first	and	foremost	a	libertarian	and	opponent	of	federal	interference	in	(what	he took	to	be)	state	matters. This	is	what	led	him	to	vote	against	the	landmark	Civil Rights	Act	in	1964. (He	spoke	in	favour	of	its	goals,	but	against	using	the	federal government	to	implement	these	goals.) All	this	placed	Goldwater	in	a	delicate position	politically:	to	win	the	South,	he	needed	to	convince	racist	voters	that	he shared	their	views. But	he	was	unwilling	to	spend	much	time	discussing	race. His	handlers	found	an	excellent	solution. A	part	of	the	solution	was	to	take	his one	speech	about	the	Civil	Rights	Act	and	try	to	give	it	as	much	visibility	as	they could. But	from	our	perspective	the	more	interesting	solution	involved Goldwater's	advocacy	of	"states'	rights". In	the	United	States,	there	is	always	a	balance	to	be	struck	between	federal	laws and	the	quite	substantial	autonomy	granted	to	states. There	are	disagreements over	exactly	how	to	strike	this	balance. Those	who	advocate	more	autonomy	for states	are	proponents	of	"states	rights".	But	this	is	not	the	full	story. "States' rights"	has	come	to	function	as	a	dogwhistle	in	the	American	South	because	of the	idea's	role	in	struggles	over	race	and	racism. During	(and	before)	the	Civil War,	the	slave-holding	states	insisted	that	they	should	be	allowed	to	maintain the	institution	of	slavery	because	whether	or	not	to	do	so	was	a	matter	that states,	not	the	federal	government,	should	decide. And	during	the	battle	against legally	mandated	racial	segregation,	the	segregationist	states	argued	that	it	was their	right,	as	states,	to	decide	whether	or	not	to	integrate.	This	history	has	made the	phrase	"states'	rights"	a	potent	dogwhistle	in	the	South.	Since	Goldwater happily	gave	many	speeches	on	the	importance	of	states'	rights-in	his	case motivated	more	by	libertarianism	than	by	racism-his	handlers	had	many utterances	they	could	play	out	of	context	in	the	South	to	dogwhistle	opposition	to integration. These	replayings,	it	seems	to	me,	were	unintentional	dogwhistles. 8	http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-gerson-barry-goldwaterswarning-to-the-gop/2014/04/17/9e8993ec-c651-11e3-bf7abe01a9b69cf1_story.html 3.2 Willie	Horton	and	the	Reporters There	is	by	now	ample	evidence	that	the	Bush	campaign	was	deliberately dogwhistling	about	race	with	the	Willie	Horton	ad. However,	there	is	no	reason to	believe	that	the	reporters	and	TV	producers	of	the	time	were	doing	this. Certainly	some	may	have	been,	but	many	were	not. Yet	nonetheless	they replayed	the	ad	over	and	over,	and	discussed	Horton	and	his	crimes	over	and over	in	the	context	of	the	election. This,	in	fact,	was	what	allowed	the	effects Mendelberg	discusses	to	be	so	widespread	and	so	powerful:	the	original advertisement	was	only	shown	briefly	in	a	small	area,	but	it	was	re-shown	again and	again	as	a	part	of	news	reports	ostensibly	about	"negative	campaigning"	or "crime". I	take	these	re-showings	to	be	unintentional	dogwhistles. This	shows just	how	important	such	unintentional	dogwhistles	can	be	in	accomplishing	an intentional	dogwhistle's	goals. Indeed,	such	is	their	importance	that	they deserve	a	term	of	their	own.	I	will	call	these	'amplifier	dogwhistles',	since	they greatly	increase	the	reach	of	the	original	dogwhistle. And,	just	as	an	amplifier	is not	responsible	for	the	original	sound	that	it	amplifies,	those	who	carry	out	acts of	amplifier	dogwhistling	will	are	not	be	responsible	for	the	original	dogwhistle whose	reach	they	are	enhancing. 3.3	Racialisation	of	'government	spending' Throughout	the	1980s,	a	converted	effort	was	made	by	the	Republican	Party	in the	US	to	associate	government	spending	with	racial	minorities. (Ronald	Reagan was	especially	important	to	this	campaign.) This	effort	was	enormously successful:	Media	coverage	of	government	assistance,	for	example,	came	to	focus disproportionately	on	black	recipients	of	assistance,	despite	the	fact	that	they	are the	minority	of	those	on	such	assistance	(Valentino	et.	al.	75). And,	we	will	see, these	efforts	have	brought	it	about	that	even	terms	like	'government	spending' now	serve	as	racial	dogwhistles. Utterances	containing	such	terms	are,	as	a result,	sometimes	intentional	dogwhistles-when	the	utterances	are	made	with the	intention	of	making	racial	attitudes	salient. But	these	terms	are	widely	used, as	what	the	country	should	spend	money	on	is	an	issue	that	simply	has	to	be discussed. And	so	they	will	extremely	often	function	as	unintentional	implicit dogwhistles.	Indeed,	they	will	often	serve	as	amplifier	dogwhistles. We'll	begin	by	examining	the	evidence	that	utterances	of	these	words	can function	as	implicit	racial	dogwhistles. We	can	see	very	clearly	that	this	is	the case	from	Valentino	et.	al.'s	study	of	racial	priming	and	political	advertising. Their	study	involves	showing	participants	one	of	several	versions	of	a	carefully constructed	advertisement. In	every	version,	the	words	of	the	advertisement, ostensibly	for	George	W.	Bush,	criticizes	Democrats	for	"wasteful	spending"	and says	(to	take	one	example	from	a	complex	ad)	that	Bush	will	"reform	an	unfair system	that	only	provides	healthcare	for	some,	while	others	go	without"	(79). What	varies	across	versions	is	the	visuals. One	version,	Neutral,	uses	wholly neutral	visuals,	like	medical	files	and	the	Statue	of	Liberty. The	second,	Race Comparison,	uses	images	of	e.g.	a	black	family	being	helped	while	the	words "healthcare	for	some"	are	uttered;	and	images	of	a	white	mother	and	child	while the	words	"others	go	without"	are	uttered. The	third,	Undeserving	Blacks,	does not	contain	images	comparing	treatment	of	whites	and	blacks,	but	does	show images	designed	trigger	associations	of	race	and	government	spending. So,	it shows	the	black	family	being	helped	just	as	in	Race	Comparison;	but	it	shows medical	files	while	"others	go	without"	are	uttered.	A	control	group	viewed	a totally	non-political	advertisement. After	viewing	the	advertisements,	subjects completed	a	test	to	assess	the	accessibility	of	racial	attitudes. They	then completed	a	questionnaire	regarding	their	assessment	of	presidential candidates,	the	importance	of	various	issues,	and	their	racial	and	political attitudes. Below	is	a	table	(Valentino	and	Hutchings:	79)	showing	the	workings of	the	various	versions	of	the	advertisement. TABLE 1. Transcripts of Implicit Race Cue Advertising Manipulation Narrative Neutral	Visuals Race	Comparison Undeserving Blacks George	W.	Bush, dedicated	to building	an America	with strong	values George	Bush	in crowd	shaking hands George	Bush	in crowd	shaking hands George	Bush	in crowd	shaking hands Democrats	want	to spend	your	tax dollars	on	wasteful government programs,	but George	W.	Bush will	cut	taxes because	you	know best	how	to	spend the	money	you earn. Image	of	Statue	of Liberty,	Treasury Building Bush	sitting	on couch,	residential street	(no	people) Black	person counting	money, black	mother and	child	in office Bush	sitting	on couch,	white person	writing check,	white person	counting money,	white teacher Black	person counting	money, black	mother and	child	in office Bush	sitting	on couch,	residential street	(no	people) Governor	Bush cares	about families. Laboratory workers	(race unclear)	looking into	microscopes White	parents walking	with child Residential	street (shot	continued	as above) He'll	reform	an unfair	system	that only	provides health	care	for some,	while	others go	without	proper treatment	because their	employer can't	afford	it. Medical	files White	nurse assisting	black mother,	child White	mother holding	child White	nurse assisting	black mother,	child Medical	files When	he's president,	every hard-working American	will have	affordable, high-quality health	care. X-rays	against	lit background Bush	talking	to white	family, talking	to	white child,	Bush kissing	white	girl X-rays	against	lit background George	W.	Bush,	a fresh	start	for America Bush,	arm	around wife.	Screen	reads "George	W.	Bush" and	"A	Fresh Start" Bush,	arm	around wife.	Screen	reads "George	W.	Bush" and	"A	Fresh Start" Bush,	arm	around wife.	Screen	reads "George	W.	Bush" and	"A	Fresh Start" Valentino	et.	al.	found	that	racial	resentment	had	little	effect	on	preference between	candidates	unless	subjects	had	viewed	one	of	the	political advertisements. But	if	they	had	viewed	one	of	the	political	advertisements,	the impact	of	racial	resentment	on	candidate	preference	was	increased-even	in	the neutral	condition	in	which	the	advertisement	contained	no	racialised	imagery, just	words	about	government	spending. Indeed,	the	effect	in	the	Neutral Condition	was	just	as	strong	as	in	the	Race	Comparison	condition	(though	less strong	than	in	the	Undeserving	Blacks	condition). This	shows	very	clearly	that "government	spending"	has	become	an	implicit	dogwhistle,	which	functions	like the	Willie	Horton	ad	or	"inner	city". And	this	fact	should	be	enormously disconcerting,	as	it	indicates	just	how	very	widespread	such	priming	is. The widespread	nature	of	such	priming	makes	it	extremely	difficult	to	discuss	issues absolutely	central	to	democracy-such	as	what	a	government	should	spend	its money	on-without	opinions	being	influenced	by	racial	attitudes.9 Importantly,	Valentino	et.	al.	also	tested	the	impact	of	counter-stereotypical images. In	these	versions	of	the	advertisement,	the	images	of	black	families appear	as	the	ad	discusses	"hard-working	families",	and	so	on. These	ads	are designed	to	jar	with	the	racist	stereotypes	that	viewers	have	likely	absorbed through	cultural	exposure. The	effects	were	dramatic. When the black racial cues are stereotype-inconsistent, however, the relationship between racial attitudes and the vote disappears... Violating racial stereotypes with positive images of blacks dramatically undermines racial priming. The presence of black images alone, therefore, does not prime negative racial attitudes. The effect emerges only when the pairing of the visuals with the narrative subtly reinforces negative stereotypes in the mind of the viewer. This is a crucial point, as it raises another possible way of combatting the influence of implicit dogwhistles. It shows that it is possible to discuss government spending without priming racial attitudes. But avoiding racial imagery is not the way to do this-instead, one must make a concerted effort to include the right racial imagery. The right racial imagery will be counterstereotypical imagery that can serve to undermine the dogwhistles 9	This	sort	of	concern	is	very	important	to	Stanley	(2015). (primary or secondary) that would otherwise be present (whatever one's intentions). This requires awareness and effort on the part of the speaker, who might otherwise think that they have avoided triggering racial attitudes by avoiding overtly racial imagery or words. (See the table below, from Valentino and Hutchings: 80) Table	2.	Transcripts	of	Counter-Stereotypic	Advertising Manipulation Narrative Deserving	Blacks Deserving Whites Undeserving Whites George	W.	Bush, dedicated	to	building an	America	with strong	values. George	Bush	in crowd	shaking hands,	black woman	with American	flag	in background,	black veteran	smiling George	Bush	in crowd	shaking hands George	Bush	in crowd	shaking hands Democrats	want	to spend	your	tax dollars	on	wasteful government programs,	but	George W.	Bush	will	cut	taxes because	you	know best	how	to	spend	the money	you	earn. Treasury	building Bush	sitting	on couch,	black person	laying money	on	a counter Bush	sitting	on couch,	white person	writing	a check,	white person	counting money White	person counting	money, white	mother and	child	in office Bush	sitting	on couch,	residential street	(no	people) Governor	Bush	cares about	families. Black	family	using a	computer,	black family	eating	at	a restaurant White	teacher, white	parents walking	with child Residential	street (shot	continued as	above) He'll	reform	an	unfair system	that	only provides	health	care for	some,	while	others go	without	proper treatment	because their	employer	can't afford	it. Laboratory workers	(race unclear)	looking into	microscopes Black	women holding	baby Laboratory workers	(race unclear)	looking into	microscopes White	mother holding	child White	mother holding newborn receiving medical	care	in hospital Medical	files When	he's	president, every	hard-working American	will	have affordable,	highquality	health	care. Bush	shaking hands	with	black children,	black kids	sitting	in school	yard,	Bush sitting	in classroom	reading with	black	kids Bush	talking	to white	family, Bush	talking	to white	child,	Bush kissing	white girl X-rays	against	lit background George	W.	Bush,	a fresh	start	for America Bush,	arm	around wife.	Screen	reads "George	W.	Bush" Bush,	arm	around wife.	Screen	reads "George	W.	Bush" Bush,	arm	around wife.	Screen	reads "George	W.	Bush" and	"A	Fresh	Start" and	"A	Fresh Start" and	"A	Fresh Start" 4. Why	Existing	Accounts	Cannot	Fully	Capture 4.1	What	existing	accounts	can	capture Existing	accounts	do	fairly	well	with	an	explicit	intentional	dogwhistle. As noted	in	the	discussion	above,	it	is	quite	plausible	to	suppose	that	'Dred	Scott' utterances	carry	conversational	implicatures	about	opposition	to	abortion. Elisabeth	Camp	(2013)	goes	a	step	further	and	introduces	the	notion	of insinuation. A	speaker	insinuates	some	proposition	P	just	in	case	she communicates	P	without	entering	P	into	the	conversational	record.	The speaker	intends	her	intention	to	be	recognised,	but	without	a	willingness	or responsibility	to	own	up	to	it.10	This	is	an	important	notion. "Intuitively, the whole point of insinuation – what defines it and makes it rhetorically useful – is that it involves off-record communication: the speaker means (and when successful, communicates) something without putting it on the conversational record. If this is right, then the very existence of insinuation demonstrates that we can't simply equate what a speaker means with her utterance's contribution to the conversational score or record." (REF) Camp	treats	Bush's	Dred	Scott	dogwhistle	as	a	paradigm	case	of	insinuation, and	this	seems	plausible.	Bush	intends	to	have	his	anti-abortion	message recognized,	and	recognized	as	intended. At	the	same	time,	though,	use	of	a code	phrase	gives	allows	him	to	avoid	placing	his	contribution	on	the record-thus	achieving	deniability. 4.2 More	difficult	cases Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	are	substantially	more	challenging	to capture. There	are	two	key	reasons	for	this. First,	what	is	dogwhistled	is	not 10	Camp	describes	this	as	'implicit'	communication. This	is	clearly	a	different usage	from	Mendelberg's,	as	Camp	is	interested	in	cases	in	which	at	least	part	of the	audience	recognizes	the	speaker's	intention,	and	is	expected	to	do	so. a	particular	proposition. Instead,	certain	pre-existing	attitudes	are	brought to	salience. This	means	that	any	theory	relying	on	the	communication	(via semantics	or	pragmatics)	of	a	particular	proposition	will	fail.	Second,	this occurs	outside	of	consciousness. Crucially,	when	an	audience	becomes conscious	of	the	dogwhistle,	it	fails	to	achieve	its	intended	effect. Success	of an	implicit	intentional	dogwhistle,	then-unlike	most	communicative	acts- depends	on	the	audience	not	recognizing	the	speaker's	intention. Any	theory which	includes	the	idea	that	uptake	(recognition	of	the	speaker's	intention)	is required	for	success	will	fail	entirely	as	a	way	of	accommodating	implicit dogwhistles. Implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	only	succeed	where	uptake	is absent;	uptake	prevents	such	dogwhistles	from	being	effective.11 Two	sorts	of	theories,	however,	hold	out	some	promise	for	capturing	them: Langton	and	McGowan's	work	on	conversational	accommodation,	especially McGowan's	notion	of	conversational	exercitives;	and	Jason	Stanley's	recent work	on	propaganda	and	not-at-issue	content. We	will	see,	however,	that neither	of	these	is	fully	able	to	capture	the	complexity	of	these	cases. 4.2.1 Stanley Jason	Stanley	is	the	only	philosopher	to	have	discussed	what	I	call	'implicit dogwhistles'	(both	intentional	and	unintentional),	which	he	takes	to	be	a particularly	insidious	form	of	propaganda. On	Stanley's	view,	these	function by	introducing	into	conversation	some	pernicious	"not-at-issue"	effects. Notat-issue	content	is	material	that	becomes	part	of	the	conversation's	common ground	without	being	explicitly	put	up	for	consideration	in	the	way	that asserted	content	is. This	makes	it	more	difficult	to	notice	that	this	content	is being	added	to	the	common	ground,	and	also	more	difficult	to	object	to. It also	cannot	be	canceled	(Stanley:	139). Stanley	argues	that	certain	words come	to	carry	not-at-issue	content	of	a	highly	problematic	sort: 11	Dogwhistles	are	not	alone	in	having	this	latter	feature. Most	acts	of	deception are	also	like	this:	if	the	audience	recognizes	the	speaker's	intention	to	deceive	the deception	fails. Jennifer Saul  29/1/2016 20:56 Comment [1]: Check	this. When the news media connects images of urban Blacks repeatedly with mentions of the term "welfare," the term "welfare" comes to have not-at-issue content that Blacks are lazy. (Stanley: 138) Stanley also suggests that the not-at-issue effect of a term can take the form of a preference ordering, taking the form of a ranking of groups in terms of worthiness of respect. So, a term may cause those who encounter it to rank groups differently, in a way that erodes respect for some groups. One might even come to rank groups as worthy of more or less empathy, which for Stanley is an especially important sort of not-at-issue effect. Stanley's approach is able to accommodate the way that audiences may be unaware of what is really going on in an implicit dogwhistle utterance. Not-atissue content is (sometimes) entered into the common ground without an audience's explicit awareness that this is taking place: this is a key part of what makes it so insidious. Nonetheless, Stanley's approach does not accommodate all that psychologists have taught us about how these utterances work. Stanley suggests that words like 'welfare' erode respect for black people either by carrying a not-at-issue content that black people are lazy or causing people to implement a preference ranking according to which black people are less deserving of empathy than white people are. Moreover, he suggests that this cannot be cancelled, and that it will be present in every use of a term like 'welfare'.12 But this fails to fit with the data in certain key ways. The first problem is that the use of implicit dogwhistle terms like 'welfare' or even the viewing of advertisements like the Willie Horton ads do not (in general) cause changes in racial attitudes.13 Instead, they make accessible pre-existing 12	He	does	allow	for	the	possibility	of	change	over	time,	but	only	when	there	is "sufficient	control	of	the	media	and	other	instruments	of	power"	(162)	by	those advocating	a	change. He	does	not	allow	for	conversation-by-conversation variation. 13	It	is	worth	emphasizing	that	the	worry	I	am	raising	here	is	specific	to	the	claim that	racial	dogwhistles	cause	changes	in	racial	attitudes,	based	on	specific	study of	these	utterances. I	am	not	at	all	skeptical	about	the	general	idea	of	linguistic attitudes, and bring them to bear on issues where they might not otherwise have played a role in decision-making. This is quite different from Stanley's picture, on which the terms either cause new claims to be added to the common ground, or cause changes in people's preference rankings14. The second problem is related to this one. It is that the effects of implicit dogwhistle terms are not quite so monolithically negative as Stanley takes them to be. We can see this either intuitively or by looking at the empirical evidence. Intuitively, we can imagine a black speaker addressing a left-wing black audience and saying "My mother was on welfare while she did the engineering degree that lifted our family out of poverty". This use of 'welfare' will not carry any suggestion that black people are lazy, nor will it erode respect for black people. If we prefer to look back on the empirical data, we can return to the findings discussed earlier. Adding 'inner city' to the question about prison funding caused those low in racial resentment to be less likely to agree that more prisons should be built. Pre-existing racial attitudes-whatever they are-are activated by implicit racial dogwhistle terms. If the attitudes are racially resentful, then there is likely to be an outcome that indeed fits with a lack of respect for black people. But if the attitudes are not racially resentful, the outcome is likely to be entirely different. Finally, challenging a dogwhistle successfully may not be as difficult as Stanley suggests. The priming of racial resentment only works if it remains implicit. If a dogwhistle term like 'welfare' is used but race is made explicit, the effect vanishes. Recall also that as soon as Jesse Jackson raised the issue of race, the utterances	causing	changes	in	attitudes-indeed	I	think	this	is	widespread. Nor am	I	even	sceptical	about	the	idea	that	racial	dogwhistles	cause	some	changes	in attitudes:	After	all,	viewing	the	Willie	Horton	ad	caused	many	voters	to	change their	voting	intentions	and	their	beliefs	about	who	was	the	best	candidate. 14 Some of Stanley's claims are also at odds with the idea that dogwhistles alter attitudes. For example, he writes, "As Tali Mendelberg shows, stereotypes of black Americans have remained constant throughout the history of the Republic." (135) Willie Horton ad ceased to be effective. But the fact that it sometimes does shows that some challenges can succeed rather easily. 4.2.2 Langton	and	McGowan Langton	(2012)	discusses	many	ways	that	hate	speech	might	function. For	our purposes	here	the	most	promising	is	one	based	on	Lewis	and	Stalnaker's	work on	conversational	score. [Utterances	of	hate	speech]	may	implicitly	presuppose	certain	facts	and norms,	rather	than	explicitly	enacting	them;	but	these	implicit presuppositions	may	nonetheless	work	in	ways	that	are	comparable	to classic	Austinian	illocutions.	Consumers	then	change	their	factual	and normative	beliefs	by	taking	on	board	the	'common	ground'	(in	Robert Stalnaker's	phrase)	or	the	'conversational	score'	(in	David	Lewis's	phrase) that	is	presupposed	in	the...'conversation'.	(83) Langton	further	suggests	that	emotions	like	desire	and	hate	may	be	introduced into	the	common	ground	through	roughly	the	same	procedure-or,	in	Lewis's terms,	their	appropriateness	may	become	part	of	the	conversational	score. Langton	tentatively	suggests	that	the	two	accounts	may	be	related	as	follows: Lewis's	account	captures	the	immediate	way	that	what	counts	as	acceptable	may change,	and	this	then	leads	to	changes	in	the	attitudes	and	emotions	that	are	part of	the	taken-for-granted	common	ground	of	the	conversation. It	is	useful	to	understand	this	in	terms	of	Mary	Kate	McGowan's	model	(2004, 2012). McGowan	suggests	that	these	alterations	in	the	conversational	score should	be	understood	as	due	to	covert	exercitives. These	are	speech	acts	which do	not	require	any	special	authority	on	the	part	of	the	speaker	(unlike	more standard	exercitives	such	as	ruling	a	play	in	football	as	a	foul.)	Crucially,	they may	or	may	not	be	intended	by	the	speaker	or	recognized	by	the	audience. McGowan	suggests	that	these	acts	will	be	very	widespread	in	any	normgoverned	activity	(and	that	a	huge	variety	of	activities	are	norm-governed). What	is	permissible	in	such	activities	depends	both	on	the	rules	(implicit	or explicit)	of	those	activities,	and	on	what	has	happened	before. In	a	conversation, what	is	permissible	adapts	quickly	and	seamlessly	in	response	to	what	people say. Suppose	Jeff	makes	an	utterance	that	carries	a	presupposition,	such	as	(1): (1) Yes,	my	wife	and	I	like	to	do	that. If	nobody	protests,	then	it	becomes	permissible	(in	this	context)	to	make	other utterances	in	this	conversation	that	assume	that	Jeff	has	a	wife. Similarly, McGowan	suggests	that	if	Jeff	makes	a	racist	utterance	and	nobody	protests,	it becomes	permissible	(in	this	context)	to	make	further	racist	utterances. Depending	on	the	context	and	the	nature	of	the	utterance,	it	may	also	enact further	racist	permissibility	facts	(McGowan	2012:	137-9). The	most	appealing	elements	of	this	picture	for	dealing	with	implicit	dogwhistles are	that	(a)	significant	changes	to	common	ground	or	to	score	may	occur implicitly;	and	(b)	it	is	not	just	focused	on	propositions	believed	or	taken	for granted,	but	also	on	norms	and	emotions. The	suggestion	would	be,	then,	that e.g.	the	Willie	Horton	ad	implicitly	alters	the	facts	about	what	it	is	appropriate	to take	into	account	in	making	voting	decisions. The	normative	score-regarding what	one's	voting	decisions	should	be	based	on-is	subtly	altered	by	the	Willie Horton	ad,	outside	of	the	awareness	of	those	who	view	it. This	leads	viewers	to take	race	into	account	in	their	voting	decisions. And	since	McGowan	allows	that this	may	occur	unintentionally,	we	can	accommodate	both	intentional	and unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles. At	first,	this	seems	like	a	very	good	fit. However,	there	is	a	crucial	problem:	if dogwhistles	were	actually	changing	permissibility	facts,	discussing	what	has been	implicitly	added	would	not	destroy	their	effects	in	the	way	that	it	does. When	Jesse	Jackson	raised	the	possibility	that	the	Willie	Horton	ads	were	related to	race,	viewers	stopped	allowing	their	vote	to	be	influenced	by	their	racial attitudes. If	the	ad	actually	had	made	it	permissible	to	base	their	voting	decision on	racial	attitudes,	this	would	not	have	happened. When	we	reflect	on something	that	we	genuinely	take	to	be	permissible,	we	don't	reject	it-even	if it's	something	we	haven't	reflected	on. Imagine,	for	example,	that	I	am	immersed in	a	country	with	different	conventions	about	personal	space,	and	I	take	on	those conventions	without	realizing	it. If	someone	in	this	country	remarks	on	the	fact, I	don't	reject	it:	instead,	I	realize	that	the	permissibility	facts	have	changed	for me,	at	least	for	the	duration	of	my	time	in	this	country. When	one	calls	attention to	a	racial	dogwhistle,	what	happens	is	very	different:	what	happens	looks,	for	all the	world,	like	a	discovery	that	one	was	doing	something	impermissible.	This shows	that	the	Langton/McGowan	story	cannot	capture	these	cases. 4.2.3	Implicit	Intentional	Dogwhistles	as	covert	perlocutionary	speech	acts My	view	is	that	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	must	be	understood	as	a	species of	perlocutionary	speech	acts. Perlocutionary	speech	acts	are	not	much discussed	by	philosophers	of	language,	and	with	good	reason. They	are	quite	a motley	and	unsystematic	collection	of	acts,	difficult	to	theorise. (Contrast	the simple	illocutionary	act	of	getting	married	with	the	intended	perlocutionary	acts of	being	happy,	making	one's	ex	jealous,	getting	to	wear	that	lovely	dress, acquiring	citizenship,	becoming	financially	secure;	and	the	unintended perlocutionary	acts	of	making	one's	parents	cry,	devastating	a	secret	admirer, inspiring	some	friends	to	get	married,	and	so	on.) However,	individual	kinds	of perlocutionary	acts	can	be	extremely	important. And	the	perlocutionary	seems very	much	the	right	category	for	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	upon	brief reflection:	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles,	after	all,	are	very	much	a	matter	of intended	effects	on	their	audiences. My	suggestion	is	that	implicit	intentional	dogwhistles	should	be	understood	as what	I	will	call	covert	perlocutionary	acts. A	covert	perlocutionary	act	is	one	that does	not	succeed	if	the	intended	perlocutionary	effect	is	recognized	as	intended. Although	this	category	has	not	been	much	discussed	as	a	category,	implicit dogwhistles	are	not	the	only	covert	perlocutionary	acts. Another	important	kind of	covert	perlocutionary	act	is	deception. One	who	deceives	can	usually	only succeed	if	their	intention	to	deceive	is	not	recognized.	This	is	the	defining	feature of	a	covert	perlocutionary	act. An	implicit	intentional	dogwhistle	cannot	succeed if	the	intended	effect	is	recognized	as	intended,	so	it	is	a	covert	perlocutionary act. There	are	some	clear	advantages	to	this	account. Since	I	understand	implicit intentional	dogwhistles	as	perlocutionary	acts,	I	need	not	understand	them	as about	propositions. Nor	need	I	claim	that	they	are	added	to	the	common	ground, or	in	any	way	consciously	available	to	their	audience. I	can	also	very	easily	make sense	of	the	sorts	of	variation	we	have	seen:	Not	every	utterance	using	a particular	dogwhistle	term	will	be	intended	to	have	the	same	effect,	so	we	can give	the	right	understanding	of	the	black	speaker	describing	his	mother's	use	of welfare	to	earn	an	engineering	degree. And	not	every	perlocutionary	effect	will be	intended-so	we	can	accommodate	the	fact	that	anti-racist	attitudes	will	be raised	to	salience	for	some	voters,	even	when	this	effect	is	not	intended. Finally, perlocutionary	effects	can	be	blocked,	as	Jesse	Jackson's	utterance	eventually began	blocking	the	intended	effects	of	the	Willie	Horton	ad. 4.2.3.2	Unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles There	is	more	than	one	way	to	fit	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	into	this picture. Option	1:	Unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	are	not	themselves	covert perlocutionary	acts,	since	the	intention	of	the	speaker	is	not	related	to	the dogwhistle,	which	the	speaker	is	unaware	of. So	there	can	be	no	question of	the	act	failing	if	the	speaker's	intention	is	recognized. Unintentional implicit	dogwhistles,	on	this	story,	are	simply	speech	acts	which	have particularly	pernicious	unintended	perlocutionary	effects. Unintended perlocutionary	effects	are	extremely	common,	so	there's	nothing particular	special	going	on,	except	that	these	unintended	effects	are	a	part of	someone	else's	(not	the	speaker's)	plan. This	option	perhaps underplays	the	role	of	manipulation. Option	2:	The	second	option	puts	more	of	an	emphasis	on	the	way	that unintentional	implicit	dogwhistles	fit	in	to	the	manipulation	that	is	taking place. Those	who	create	the	initial	implicit	dogwhistles	are	very	good	at attaching	pernicious	associations	to	words	and	images	(and	possibly other	things	as	well)	and	sending	them	out	into	the	world	in	the	hope	that they	will	be	taken	up	and	used	by	others,	bringing	with	them	these associations. One	might,	then,	take	the	creators	of	the	dogwhistles	to	be in	some	important	sense	the	utterers	of	the	unintentional	implicit dogwhistles. This	would	allow	one	to	treat	the	unintentional	dogwhistles as	covert	perlocutionary	acts,	fully	recognizing	the	way	that	they	fit	into this	sort	of	manipulation. The	problem	with	this	story,	though,	is	that	it underplays	the	agency	of	those	who	repeat	the	dogwhistles. These	people really	are	the	speakers,	and	they	need	to	be	thought	of	as	such,	and	held accountable	for	the	effects	of	their	speech. On	balance,	the	best	approach	seems	to	me	to	be	Option	1. But	it	is	important	in adopting	this	approach	that	one	not	lose	sight	of	the	way	that	the	utterers	of	the uninteional	implicit	dogwhistles	have	been	manipulated-and	important	to remember	that	somebody	did	intend	the	pernicious	effects	of	these	utterances, even	though	their	utterers	did	not. And,	in	fact,	this	helps	us	to	see	more	about what	is	so	insidious:	as	they	unknowingly	utter	secondary	implicit	dogwhistles, people	are	made	into	mouthpieces	for	an	ideology	that	they	reject.	The	actual utterers	are	the	speakers,	and	this	is	why	they	need	to	pay	attention	to	the effects	of	what	they	say,	and	to	the	careful	manipulation	that	has	caused	them	to say	these	things.15 A	further	advantage	of	this	approach	is	that	we	can	accommodate	two	distinct varieties	of	unintentional	implicit	dogwhistle.	The	first	is	what	I	have	called 'amplifier	dogwhistles',	which	help	to	spread	the	effects	of	intentional	implicit dogwhistles. The	second,	which	is	not	my	focus	here,	is	unintentional	implicit 15	An	especially	interesting	case	will	be	that	of	Barry	Goldwater's	utterances about	states'	rights. They	were	made	with	the	intention	of	merely	commenting on	constitutional	structure. But	they	were	replayed	in	contexts	where	his handlers	knew	they	would	function	as	dogwhistles. The	initial	utterances	were not	dogwhistles. Their	replayings	were,	however,	unintentional	dogwhistles. Unintentional	dogwhistles,	though,	are	not	to	be	understood	as	covert perlocutionary	acts. Instead	they	are	acts	which	have	unintended	(by	the speaker)	perlocutionary	effects. Of	course,	in	this	case	the	effects	are	unintended by	the	speaker	but	intended	by	the	handlers	who	choose	where	and	when	to replay	the	utterances. dogwhistles	which	don't	originate	in	deliberate	attempts	to	manipulate. It	has been	suggested	to	me	that	'crafty'	functions	this	way	in	sports	commentary, dogwhistling	whiteness	but	without	any	deliberate	attempt	to	manipulate	the salience	of	audience	members'	racial	attitudes.16 5. Political	Upshot Of	course,	what	makes	this	underexplored	topic	so	important	is	that	dogwhistles represent	a	vital	part	of	strategies	by	which	we	are	influenced-in	fact, manipulated-in	our	thinking,	and	in	our	decisions. In	particular,	these	have enormous	and	important	political	effects. The	political	implications	of dogwhistles	have	not	been	much	discussed	by	philosophers. Robert	Goodin	and Michael	Saward	(2005),	however,	have	discussed	the	political	implications	of explicit	dogwhistles;	and	Jason	Stanley	has	discussed	the	political	implications	of implicit	dogwhistles. All	three	of	these	theorists	argue	that	dogwhistles	pose serious	problems	for	democracy,	although	the	problems	they	identify	differ.	I certainly	agree	that	dogwhistles	can	pose	problems	for	democracy,	but	I	don't fully	agree	with	any	of	these	philosophers	on	the	nature	and	seriousness	of	the problems. 5.1	Dogwhistles	and	Democratic	Mandates Goodin	and	Saward	argue	that	explicit	intentional	dogwhistles	(they	don't discuss	implicit	or	unintentional	dogwhistles,	so	in	fact	they	just	use	the	term 'dogwhistle')	may	undermine	democratic	mandates	for	particular	policies,	but that	they	do	not	pose	difficulties	with	regard	to	a	mandate	to	rule. Their	focus	is on	cases	in	which	a	political	party	(or	a	politician)	advocates	a	particular	policy using	a	phrase	that	dogwhistles	a	message	to	one	audience	which	another audience	is	unaware	of. To	take	an	artificial	(though	not	totally	artificial) example,	imagine	a	party	that	trumpets	its	opposition	to	Dred	Scott	in	many	of its	campaign	commercials. The	party	gets	the	support	of	both	anti-racism	and 16	I	am	grateful	to	Tyler	Doggett	and	Randall	Harp	for	this	suggestion. anti-abortion	voters. This	party,	when	victorious,	could	not	declare	a	mandate for	banning	abortion,	because	only	some	of	the	voters	took	this	to	be	what	they were	voting	for. Hence,	Goodin	and	Saward	argue,	policy	mandates	are undermined	when	policy	preferences	are	merely	dogwhistled. However, Goodin and Saward hold that a mandate to rule is not undermined in this way, because everybody who votes for politician P knows exactly what they are voting for: that politician P should rule. A conservative party dog-whistles an encouraging message to racists that its own traditional supporters would instantly repudiate. It wins the ensuing election. Half its voters voted for it purely because of its (coded) support for racist policies; half voted for it purely because of its traditionally decent policies on race. Clearly, the party won a majority; clearly, it has a mandate to rule. But under those circumstances, it equally clearly could not claim a policy mandate to pursue either of the two contradictory policies that won it its votes. (2005: 475) Goodin and Saward argue, then that a party cannot claim a mandate for its policies unless it refrains from engaging in dogwhistle politics (and more than this may be needed as well): It	is	worth	firmly	reminding	political	parties	that	when	they	engage in	dog	whistle	politics	in	ordinary	general	elections,	the	same phenomenon	that	they	are	counting	on	to	increase	their	share	of votes	also	undercuts	the	authority	that	they	might	secure	by winning	the	vote.	(2005:	476) It seems to me, however, that Goodin and Saward's arguments do not go quite far enough. If they are right about the policy mandate, then the mandate to rule may also often be undermined. This will happen, for example, in the case of single-issue voters, of which there are likely to be many. If a voting decision is based on abortion policy, and different messages are sent about this to different groups of voters, then surely the mandate to rule is also-in any meaningful sense-undermined. Now let's turn to the case of implicit dogwhistles, which Goodin and Saward don't discuss. Implicit dogwhistles don't involve the same sort of deception. It's not the case that some viewers of the Willie Horton ad will think that Dukakis's prison policy is Q, while others will take it to be R. What will happen, however, is that the ad's target audience will vote for Bush on the basis of their racial attitudes, without realizing it. Human psychology being what it is, being unaware of one's reason for making a voting decision is surely widespread. People are unaware of the extent to which, for example, their decision of which socks to buys is based on the location of the socks on the table. It stands to reason that people would be unaware of the degree to which they are influenced by music in a commercial, subtleties of tone or body language, being reminded of a loved (or hated!) one, and so on. If such lack of awareness of influences were enough to undermine democratic authority, we would need to give up all hope of democracy. However, more than this goes on with implicit dogwhistles. In implicit dogwhistle cases, people make decisions on the basis of reasons that they would reject if they became aware of them-as we know from what happens when they are raised to consciousness. Moreover, they do this as a result of being deliberately manipulated. This looks, on the face of it, much more like a threat to democratic mandates. But if this is sufficient to undermine a mandate, then once more there may in fact be no mandates. What voter, after all, thinks that they should base their vote on music played during a campaign commercial, or on a candidate's physical appearance? And yet, all that we know about psychology suggests that factors like these are sure to impact voter choices. And all that we know about the running of campaigns (and about advertising more generally) tells us that things like this are bound to be used by campaign operatives to deliberately manipulate the voters. Being influenced by factors that we don't think should influence us is, it seems to me, an inevitable part of the human condition. And, since this is relatively widely known, using such factors to influence others will also be a standard feature of human life. If this is sufficient to undermine democratic mandates, then there are no democratic mandates. 5.2	Stanley Stanley	is	particularly	concerned	about	what	I	am	calling	'dogwhistles',	because of	the	function	that	they	serve	in	undermining	democracy. The	terms	that particularly	concern	him-like	'welfare'-	have	devastating	properties: 1. Use	of	the	relevant	expression	has	the	effect	on	the	conversation	of representing	a	certain	group	in	the	community	as	having	a	perspective not	worthy	of	inclusion,	that	is,	they	are	not	worthy	of	respect. 2. The	expression	has	a	content	that	can	serve	simply	to	contribute legitimately	to	resolving	the	debate	at	issue	in	a	reasonable	way, which	is	separate	from	its	function	as	a	mechanism	of	exclusion. 3. Mere	use	of	the	expression	is	enough	to	have	the	effect	of	eroding reasonableness.	So	the	effect	on	reasonableness	occurs	just	by	virtue of	using	the	expression,	in	whatever	linguistic	context"	(Stanley	2015: 130). If	every	use	of	one	of	these	terms	has	these	effects,	then	every	use	erodes	respect for	black	people,	and	every	use	erodes	reasonable	discussion	by	excluding	their perspective. This	is	obviously	enormously	damaging	for	democracy,	even	though the	official	content	of	the	term	might	be	a	perfectly	reasonable	contribution	to discussion. If	Stanley	is	right,	then	dogwhistle	terms	would	indeed	be	utterly	devastating- we	simply	could	not	have	a	debate	using	terms	like	'welfare'	because	all participants	would	unwittingly	be	introducing	racist	not-at-issue	content	with every	utterance,	no	matter	what	the	context,	and	no	matter	what	the	rest	of	their utterance	contained. If	this	were	right,	then	the	standard	liberal	remedy	for problematic	speech-more	speech-would	be	completely	ineffectual. There	is	much	that	is	right	in	this:	It	is	indeed	trickier	to	challenge	dogwhistles than	it	is	to	challenge,	for	example,	overtly	racist	claims. If	a	campaign commercial	explicitly	asserts	that	"black	men	are	dangerous	criminals	and Dukakis	is	insufficiently	racist",	it	is	exceptionally	easy	to	point	out	what	is wrong	with	the	ad. The	racism	is	undeniable,	and	even	the	most	timid	of journalists	will	feel	comfortable	asserting	that	racism	is	present. Those	who made	the	ad	will	have	no	recourse	but	to	either	apologise	or	confine	their electoral	prospects	to	the	explicitly	racist	voter. But	the	Willie	Horton commercial	is	very	different. Many	viewers	will	be	unaware	that	they	have watched	an	ad	that	makes	their	racial	attitudes	salient. The	ad	contains	no overtly	racist	assertions	that	are	easily	pointed	to. And	politicians	can,	and	did, easily	deny	that	there	was	racism	in	the	ad	or	in	their	intentions. Moreover, Jesse	Jackson	was	vilified	as	"playing	the	race	card"	when	he	pointed	to	the racism	of	the	ad,	and	the	suggestion	was	said	to	be	ludicrous	by	mainstream commentators. But	as	we	have	already	seen,	the	truth	is	not	quite	this	bleak. The	effects	of terms	like	'welfare'	vary	depending	(at	least)	on	the	racial	predispositions	of one's	audience,	on	whether	race	is	explicitly	under	discussion,	and	upon	the	rest of	what	one	says. Also,	recall	that	as	soon	as	Jackson	raised	the	issue	of	race	the ad	stopped	working. This	shows	that	in	an	extremely	important	sense	it	could	be challenged. And	indeed	challenged	quite	easily. Even	those	who	thought	Jackson was	wrong	to	raise	the	issue	of	racism	were	no	longer	affected	by	it	in	the	way that	its	makers	intended. Although	racism	was	now	a	part	of	the	conversation, and	so	highly	salient,	it	was	explicitly	salient	rather	than	covertly. The	ad	could only	cause	them	to	use	their	racial	attitudes	in	their	voting	decisions	as	long	as race	was	covertly	salient. A	covert	perlocutionary	speech	act	is	(in	at	least	some cases)	very	easily	challenged:	all	one	needs	to	do	is	to	make	what	has	been	covert into	an	explicit	part	of	the	conversation. But	to	fully	understand	how	to	combat	these	speech	acts,	we	must	combine	this fact	with	insights	from	Stanley: it	will	indeed	be	conversationally	challenging	to make	what	has	been	covert	explicit. People	will	reject	what	challengers	say,	and deny	that	it	is	true. Sanity	may	be,	and	often	is,	called	into	question.	Challengers will	be	accused	of	having	a	political	agenda. The	conversation	will	be	derailed, and	it	will	not	flow	smoothly. It	is	difficult,	just	as	Stanley	said,	and	as	a	result	it is	hard	to	make	oneself	do	it,	or	to	persist	in	the	face	of	this	resistance. There are,	then,	important	lessons	here	for	those	seeking	to	fight	pernicious	covert perlocutionary	acts. But	if	challengers	are	aware	of	how	these	speech	acts	work, then	it	becomes	clear	that	despite	this	resistance	it	is	well	worth	doing. As	soon as	the	issue	of	race	is	raised-even	if	raising	it	is	thought	to	be	a	mistake,	and met	with	anger-the	speech	act	we	are	trying	to	fight	stops	working. It	is	both very	hard	to	fight	and	very	easy	to	win. Those	seeking	to	challenge	these pernicious	speech	acts	need	to	remind	themselves	of	the	ease	of	winning	in order	to	gear	themselves	up	for	the	difficulty	of	the	fight.	And	importantly,	they need	to	realize	that	winning	will	not	feel	like	winning:	those	responsible	for	the speech	acts	will	not	back	down,	concede	the	truth	about	what	they	were	doing, or	apologise;	the	intended	audience	of	the	speech	acts	will	probably	insist	that the	analysis	is	wrong	and	deny	the	existence	of	the	covert	material. Yet nonetheless	the	battle	will	be	won:	the	speech	acts	will	be	neutralized. Importantly,	of	course,	we	will	only	win	these	battles	if	the	norm	of	racial equality	is	actually	in	place. And	whether	it	is	or	not	may	vary	a	great	deal	over time	and	place. We	know	from	the	sad	and	terrible	history	of	genocide	that	a community	where	this	norm	is	in	place	can	change	remarkably	quickly	into	one in	which	it	has	disappeared	(Tirrell	2012;	Smith	2011). And	we	also	know	that what	is	unacceptable	to	say	in	one	location	may	be	considered	perfectly	normal just	30	miles	away. For	this	reason,	it	is	undoubtedly	an	oversimplification	to claim	that	the	norm	of	racial	equality	is	in	force. It	is,	broadly	speaking,	in	force. But	there	will	be	times	and	places	where	it	isn't. And	at	those	times	and	places, raising	the	issue	of	race	will	not	neutralize	a	racial	dogwhistle. (For	more complexities	on	this	point,	consider	the	difficulties	raised	earlier	concerning	the content	of	the	norm.)17 Another	limitation	is	also	important	to	emphasise. What	I	have	argued	is	that explicitly	raising	the	issue	of	race	can	defuse	a	racial	dogwhistle. This	a defensive	maneuver	against	a	very	particular	sort	of	political	manipulation. It seems	to	be	highly	effective. But	it	does	not	alter	attitudes:	the	racial	resentment may	not	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	voting	choice,	but	it	remains. Nor	does	it	alter concrete	realities	in	the	world. Centuries	of	violence,	discrimination	and segregation	are	not	changed	via	a	rhetorical	maneuver. The	world	we	live	in remains	just	as	much	structured	by	racism	after	a	dogwhistle	has	been	openly discussed	as	it	was	before. It	is	vital	to	openly	discuss	the	dogwhistles,	but	this should	not	be	mistaken	for	something	more	powerful	than	it	is. 17	Nor	will	it	neutralize	it	for	those	individuals	who	simply	disagree	with	the norm,	for	even	when	and	where	the	norm	is	in	place	there	are	openly	racist people	who	explicitly	deny	the	norm. But,	of	course,	those	people	don't	need	to be	dogwhistled	to	in	order	to	activate	their	racism:	they	are	happy	to deliberately	vote	for	the	racist	candidate. Camp,	E.	2013.	"Indirection,	Inexplicitness	and	the	Conversational	Record", presented	at	Semantics	Workshop. Goodin,	R.	and	Saward,	M. 2005.	"Dogwhistles	and	Democratic	Mandates", Political	Quarterly:	471-476. Horwitz,	J.	and	M.	Peffley.	2005.	"Playing	the	Race	Card	in	the	Post-Willie	Horton Era:	The	Impact	of	Racialized	Code	Words	on	Support	for	Punitive	Prison Policy".	The	Public	Opinion	Quarterly	69:	1,	99-112. Lamis,	Alexander	P.	et	al.	(1990)	The	Two	Party	South.	Oxford	University	Press. Langton,	R.	2012. "Beyond	Belief:	Pragmatics	in	Hate	Speech	and	Pornography", in	Maitra	and	McGowan,	eds.	Speech	and	Harm:	Controversies	Over	Free Speech,	72-93.	(Oxford	University	Press) Lopez,	I.	2014.	Dog	Whistle	Politics:	How	Coded	Racial	Appeals	Have	Reinvented Racism	and	Wrecked	the	Middle	Class.	Oxford	University	Press. Mendelberg,	T.	2001.	The	Race	Card:	Campaign	Strategy,	Implicit	Messages,	and the	Norm	of	Equality.	(Princeton	University	Press) McGowan,	M.	K.	2004.	"Conversational	Exercitives:	Something	Else	We	Do	With Our	Words",	Linguistics	and	Philosophy	27	(1):93-111. McGowan,	M.	K.	2012.	"On	'Whites	Only'	Signs	and	Racist	Hate	Speech:	Verbal Acts	of	Racist	Discrimination",	in	Maitra	and	McGowan,	eds.	Speech	and Harm:	Controversies	Over	Free	Speech,	121-147.	(Oxford	University	Press) Noah,	T.	"Why	Bush	Opposes	Dred	Scott", http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2004/10/w hy_bush_opposes_dred_scott.2.html. Smith,	D	L.	2011.	Less	Than	Human:	Why	We	Demean,	Enslave,	and	Exterminate Others.	St	Martin's	Press. Stanley,	J.	2015.	The	Problem	of	Propaganda.	Princeton	University	Press. Tesler,	M.	and	Sears,	D.	O.	2010.	Obama's	Race:	The	2008	Election	and	the	Dream of	a	Post-Racial	America.	(University	of	Chicago	Press.) Tirrell,	L.	2012.	"Genocidal	Language	Games."	in	Maitra	and	McGowan,	eds. Speech	and	Harm:	Controversies	Over	Free	Speech,	174-221.	(Oxford University	Press) Valentino,	N.,	Hutchings,	V.	and	White,	I.	2002. "Cues	That	Matter:	How	Political Ads	Prime	Racial	Attitudes	During	Campaings".	American	Political	Science Review	96:	1.